









Stephen E. Haynes 





Abstract:  This note explores the insidious empirical trap posed by two common equality 
restrictions in regression analysis.  The trap is that restricted coefficients can lie outside the 
interval of unrestricted coefficients and even reverse sign when negatively correlated 
regressors are added to one another or when positively correlated regressors are subtracted 
from one another.   
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
Two classes of equality restrictions -- additive constraints, where explanatory 
variables are added to one another, and subtractive constraints, where explanatory variables 
are subtracted from one another -- are routinely imposed in regression analysis and usually 
untested.  Examples include estimation of models with linear aggregation of variables, 
distributed lags, measurement error, structural change, asymmetry, and where regressors 
have equal but opposite effects.  It is commonly expected that the restricted coefficient in 
these regressions remains in the interval between the unrestricted coefficients, hence 
represents a simple "average" of the unrestricted coefficients and certainly does not reverse 
sign.  Unfortunately, this expectation is incorrect in some cases, as additive and subtractive 
constraints can result in the empirical trap of sign reversals.  
Generalizing results in Haynes and Stone (1981), this note explores the conditions 
that determine when the common "averaging" expectation is warranted and when it is not.  
These conditions are developed in four cases -- additive constraints, with directly or 
inversely correlated regressors, and subtractive constraints, with directly or inversely 
correlated regressors.  The primary conclusion is that the "averaging" expectation may not 
be warranted in two of the four cases -- when negatively correlated regressors are added to 
one another or when positively correlated regressors are subtracted from one another.  




2.   EQUALITY RESTRICTION: ADDITIVE 
The analysis is similar to Theil's (1971, pp. 556-67) examination of linear 
aggregation, where the expected value of the restricted macroparameter is expressed as a 
weighted average of the unrestricted microparameters, and the weights sum to unity but are 
not necessarily all positive.  Consider first the simple three-variable linear model                                   
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + u                     (1) 
where Y, X1 and X2 are column vectors of T observations; α, β1, and β2 are parameters, with 
β1β2>0; and u is a column vector of T disturbances.  Imposing an additive restriction on eq. 
(1) is equivalent to estimating the model 
                     Y = α' + δ(X1 + X2) + u'                    (2) 
under the equality assumption that δ=β1=β2, where α' and δ are parameters and u' is the 
disturbance.  
With variables in deviation form, define d as the least squares estimate of  δ.  The 
expected value of the least squares estimate of δ is                     
                     E(d) = w1β1 + w2β2                          (3) 
where w1 = [Var(X1)+Cov(X1,X2)]/D; w2 = [Var(X2)+(Cov(X1,X2)]/D; and D =                      
Var(X1)+Var(X2)+2Cov(X1,X2).1  E(d) is thus a weighted average of β1 and β2, where the 
weights sum to unity but one may be negative.  As is apparent from the definition of the 
                                                 
1 Eq. (3) follows the analysis of least-squares estimation subject to linear restrictions in 
Johnston and DiNardo (1997, pp. 95-97).  Using their eq. (3.43), the OLS estimate of the 
coefficient column vector β of eq. (1) subject to the restriction that β1=β2 is 
d = b - (X'X)-1R'[R(X'X)-1R']-1Rb, where b is the unrestricted OLS estimate of the coefficient 
column vector β, X is the observation matrix of the explanatory variables, and R=[0,1,-1] .  
The second element in the column vector d is the restricted OLS estimate of β1 (and β2), i.e., 
d in the text; taking expectations of d yields eq. (3). 
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weights, the sign of Cov(X1,X2) is crucial in determining if one weight is negative, which is 
a necessary condition for a sign reversal. 
2.1   Directly Correlated and Uncorrelated Regressors 
Assume initially that Cov(X1,X2)≥0.  From eq. (3), E(d)∈[β1,β2] if Cov(X1,X2)≥0, 
and E(d)∈[β1,β2] iff w1w2 ≥0.  Thus, imposition of an additive constraint with directly 
correlated (or uncorrelated) regressors leads to the common expectation that the expected 
value of the restricted estimate lies in the interval between the population parameters, i.e., is 
a simple "average" of these parameters, and certainly cannot reverse sign from these 
parameters.  In this sense, the bias resulting from an invalid additive restriction is likely to 
be minor in that the restricted coefficient is bounded by the unrestricted population 
parameters. 
Additive restrictions with directly correlated or uncorrelated regressors are common 
in empirical practice.  Consider Theil's (1971, pp. 556-561) aggregation analysis.  
Microrelations are aggregated to macrorelations, and a macroparameter is a weighted 
average of microparameters, with the microvariables typically directed correlated.2   
Another example involves measurement error, where the measured regressor is the 
sum of the true regressor and measurement error, with the latter two traditionally assumed 
uncorrelated.  The expected value of the restricted coefficient (the coefficient on the 
measured regressor) lies between the two unrestricted population coefficients (the 
                                                 
2 Also consider the moving-average restriction used in the estimation of distributed lags.  
Present and lagged values of an explanatory variable are added under the restriction that 
they have a common coefficient, and most time series are positively autocorrelated. 
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coefficient on the true regressor and the zero coefficient on the measurement error term), 
hence does not reverse sign but is biased towards zero.3   
2.2  Inversely Correlated Regressors 
Assume alternatively that Cov(X1,X2)<0.  From eq. (3), E(d)∉[β1,β2] only if 
Cov(X1,X2)<0; E(d)∉[β1,β2] iff w1w2<0; and E(d)β1<0 iff w1w2<0 and, for wi<0,  
│wiβi│ >│wjβj│ for i≠j.  Thus, with an additive constraint and inversely correlated 
regressors, the expected value of the restricted coefficient may not lie in the interval between 
the unrestricted parameters, i.e., is not a simple "average" of the unrestricted parameters, and 
may even reverse sign relative to these parameters.  For this case, the bias is potentially 
serious because of the possibility of a sign reversal.    
Unfortunately, additive equality restrictions with inversely correlated regressors are 
empirically relevant.  Consider the example of structural change, i.e., estimating a regression 
equation where the parameters are assumed constant for a sample but in fact they are not 
constant.  First, partition the data into two subsamples, i.e., define D1 as a TxT diagonal 
selection matrix with zeros and ones on the diagonal, I as a TxT identity matrix, X as a Tx1 
column vector on the regressor.  Then define D2=I-D1, X1=D1X, and X2=D2X, which imply 
that X1+X2=X.  Importantly, Cov(X1,X2)<0 if the elements of X are the same sign for all T 
observations, which is typically the case.   
Given these interacted definitions for X1 and X2, unrestricted eq. (1) permits the 
response of Y to changes in X to differ by subsample if there is structural change, i.e., if  
β1≠β2.  However, eq. (2) restricts the response of Y to changes in X to be identical by 
                                                 
3 To see this, rewrite eq. (1) as Y= α+β1X1+0η+u , where X1 is the true regressor and η is the 
measurement error.  Estimation eq. (2) becomes Y=α'+δ(X1+η)+u', i.e., an equation with a 
regressor measured with error.
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subsample, hence leads to bias if there is structural change.  Furthermore, since the 
restriction in eq. (2) is additive and X1 and X2 are inversely correlated, the expected value of 
the pooled coefficient estimate may not lie in the interval between the subsample 
parameters, and may even reverse sign.  Finally, unlike the other examples in this note, the 
restriction of a constant structure by subsample is not actively imposed.  It is passively 
imposed by failing to account for structural change, i.e., by excluding the appropriately 
interacted regressors, and as a consequence the bias from structural change in eq. (2) may be 
especially insidious.4  
3.   EQUALITY RESTRICTION: SUBTRACTIVE 
The analysis of additive equality restrictions can be converted to the analysis of 
subtractive equality restrictions by multiplying one of the regressors by minus one.  For 
clarity, the analysis is presented explicitly, where X2 is the regressor that has been multiplied 
by minus one. 
Consider again eq. (1), repeated for convenience, but now assume β1β2<0.   
                                       Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + u         (1) 
Imposing a subtractive restriction on eq. (1) is equivalent to estimating the model 
                        Y = a' + ζ(X1 - X2) + u'                      (4) 
under the equality assumption that ζ=β1=-β2.  With the variables in deviation form and g the 
least squares estimate of ζ, the expected value of the least squares estimate of ζ is      
                                  E(g) = v1β1 - v2β2                           (5) 
                                                 
4 An analogous problem to structural change is asymmetry, where the response of the 
dependent variable to a unit increase in a regressor is assumed identical, but of opposite 
sign, to a unit decrease in the same regressor.  Haynes (1983) investigates with demographic 
data the danger of the restriction of symmetry, and shows that, contrary to common 
expectations, coefficient estimates based on symmetry do not lie in the interval between the 
unrestricted estimates, hence lead to spurious conclusions about the determinants of fertility. 
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where v1 = [Var(X1)-Cov(X1,X2)]/F; v2 = [Var(X2)-Cov(X1,X2)]/F; and F = 
Var(X1)+Var(X2)-2Cov(X1,X2).  As with additive restrictions, E(g) is a weighted average of 
β1 and β2, where the weights sum to unity but one may be negative, and the sign of 
Cov(X1,X2) is crucial in determining if one weight is negative, a necessary condition for a 
sign reversal. 
3.1  Directly Correlated Regressors 
Again, initially assume Cov(X1,X2)>0.  From eq. (5), E(g)∉[β1,-β2] only if 
Cov(X1,X2)>0; E(g)∉ [β1,-β2] iff v1v2<0; and E(ζ)β1<0 iff v1v2<0 and, for vi<0, 
│viβi│>│vjβj│ for i≠j.  Thus, with a subtractive constraint and directly correlated 
regressors, the expected value of the restricted coefficient may not lie in the interval between 
the unrestricted parameters and may even reverse sign.  This case is the analog to the 
previous case -- an additive restriction with inversely correlated regressors -- since in both 
cases the bias in estimating the restricted coefficient is potentially serious because the 
expected value of the restricted coefficient may differ in sign from the unrestricted 
parameters.   
Unfortunately, subtractive restrictions with directly correlated regressors are also 
empirically relevant.  Numerous models in international economics, including models of 
exchange rates/balance of payments, demand and supply equations for trade, international 
financial and direct investment, purchasing power parity, and covered interest rate arbitrage, 
impose subtractive constraints between corresponding domestic and foreign explanatory 
variables under the assumption that the variables have equal but opposite effects on the 
dependent variable.  Furthermore, corresponding domestic and foreign variables are usually 
directly correlated, both in levels and first differences.   
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For one example, Haynes and Stone (1981) show that evidence by Frankel (1979) 
claimed to support the monetary model of exchange rates is spurious because of sign 
reversals induced by invalid subtractive restrictions between four pairs of domestic and 
foreign variables (money, income, interest rates, and inflation).5   For a second example, 
Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2003) argue that evidence in Carr, Markusen, and Maskus 
(2001) regarding the appropriate model of foreign direct investment is spurious because of a 
sign reversal induced by an invalid subtractive restriction between domestic and foreign 
measures of skilled labor abundance.  
Another example of subtractive restrictions and directly correlated regressors 
involves the forward premium paradox, a major enigma in International Finance.  The 
paradox  is that the forward premium (the log difference between the forward exchange rate 
and the spot exchange rate) predicts future movements in the spot exchange rate, but with 
the wrong sign.  However, the regressor involves an untested subtractive restriction between 
the forward and spot exchange rates, and these two variables are highly directly correlated, 
both in levels and first differences.  In Oh and Pippenger (1994), the impact of this 
restriction is examined and a partial resolution of the paradox is suggested.        
3.2  Inversely Correlated and Uncorrelated Regressors 
Assume alternatively that Cov(X1,X2)≤0.  From eq. (5), E(g)∈[β1,-β2] if 
Cov(X1,X2) ≤0; and E(g)∈[β1,-β2] iff v1v2≥0.  As with an additive restriction and directly 
correlated (or uncorrelated) regressors, a subtractive restriction with inversely correlated (or 
uncorrelated) regressors cannot lead to serious bias in that the expected value of the 
                                                 
5 Also, Haynes and Stone (1982) demonstrate that increases in U.S. (foreign) income 
increase U.S. imports (exports), yet increases in the difference between U.S. and foreign 
income decrease U.S. net imports, i.e., imports minus exports. 
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restricted estimate lies in the interval between the population parameters, hence cannot 
reverse sign.  Although examples of this case do not seem common in empirical work, it is 
presented for completeness.  
4.  EXTENSIONS 
One extension of the above analysis involves the simultaneous imposition of several 
equality restrictions, both additive and subtractive.  Consider the debate about the Ricardian 
equivalence proposition that an increase in the government deficit induces an equal 
offsetting increase in private saving because consumers internalize their implied future tax 
liabilities.  The key test concerns regressing consumption against disposable personal 
income, defined as income minus taxes plus transfers plus government interest payments 
minus retained earnings.  Modigliani and Sterling (1986) show that when the two additive 
and two subtractive restrictions in the definition are jointly imposed, i.e., when the effect on 
consumption of a change in income, taxes, transfers, government interest payments, and 
retained earnings are assumed identical in absolute value, the evidence does not support 
Ricardian equivalence.  However, Kormendi and Meguire (1990, 1995) demonstrate that 
when these four restrictions are relaxed the evidence becomes consistent with Ricardian  
equivalence, implying that analysis of the determinants of consumption requires that the 
components of disposable personal income have distinguishable influences. 
The analysis in this note ignores the effect of additional regressors which themselves 
do not involve restrictions.  In the case where these additional regressors are independent of 
X1 and X2, the above analysis remains valid.  In the general case where additional regressors 
are correlated with X1 and X2, the impact of equality restrictions becomes more complicated, 
depending also on the coefficients on the additional regressors and the variance-covariance 
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matrix of all the regressors.  However, in this case it remains true that, ceteris paribus, an 
additive (subtractive) restriction is more likely to cause a sign reversal when the two 
combined variables are inversely (directly) correlated.6    
5.   CONCLUSION 
This note explores the danger of imposing invalid equality restrictions when the 
objective of regression estimation is to determine the sign of the unrestricted coefficients.  
The bias of invalid equality restrictions is not likely to be serious in two cases -- additive 
(subtractive) restrictions with directly (inversely) correlated regressors -- as in these cases 
the restricted coefficient is a simple "average" of the unrestricted coefficients and cannot 
reverse sign.  However, for the other two cases -- additive (subtractive) restrictions with 
inversely (directly) correlated regressors --  the bias may well cause the expected value of 
the constrained coefficient to lie outside the interval of the unconstrained coefficients, and 
even reverse sign.  For these latter two cases, hypothesis tests may frequently lead to either 
rejection of the true model or acceptance of a false one.  The conclusion of the note is that, 
because of the empirical trap of sign reversals, equality restrictions should be tested 





                                                 
6 The analysis has obvious implications for out-of-sampling forecasting.  Eqs. (3) and (5) 
show that the expected value of the restricted coefficient depends not only on the population 
parameters, but also on the variance-covariance matrix of the regressors.  As a consequence, 
forecasts based on inappropriately restricted coefficients may perform poorly because they 
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